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In this paper we ask whether policies targeting a reduction in crime rates through changes in
education outcomes can be considered an eﬀective and cost-viable alternative to interventions based
on harsher punishment alone. In particular we study the eﬀect of subsidizing high school completion.
Most econometric studies of the impact of crime policies ignore equilibrium eﬀects and are often
reduced-form. This paper provides a framework within which to study the equilibrium impact of
alternative policies. We develop an overlapping generation, life-cycle model with endogenous educa-
tion and crime choices. Education and crime depend on diﬀerent dimensions of heterogeneity, which
takes the form of diﬀerences in innate ability and wealth at birth as well as employment shocks.
PSID, NIPA and CPS data are used to estimate the parameters of a production function with dif-
ferent types of human capital and to approximate a distribution of permanent heterogeneity. These
estimates are used to pin down some of the model’s parameters. The model is calibrated to match
education enrolments, aggregate (property) crime rate and some features of the wealth distribution.
In our numerical experiments we ﬁnd that policies targeting crime reduction through increases in
high school graduation rates are more cost-eﬀective than simple incapacitation policies. Further-
more, the cost-eﬀectiveness of high school subsidies increases signiﬁcantly if they are targeted at the
wealth poor. We also ﬁnd that ﬁnancial incentives to high school graduation have radically diﬀerent
implications in general and partial equilibrium (i.e. the scale of the programmes can substantially
change its outcomes).
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Crime is a hot issue on the US policy agenda. Despite its signiﬁcant fall in the Nineties its cost to
the taxpayer has soared. The prison population has doubled over the same period and now stands at
over two millions of inmates. The yearly cost of keeping a person in jail exceeds 20,000 dollars4. These
numbers beg the question of whether the country is using a cost-eﬀective mix of policies in the ﬁght
against crime.
For reasons similar to those highlighted in Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998), the analysis of
alternative policies to tackle crime beneﬁts from the use of a dynamic equilibrium framework5. Dynamics
are important as educational and criminal choices interact in a life-cycle perspective. Furthermore, in
equilibrium any large-scale programme is likely to alter personal disposable income both through its
impact on market prices and through its ﬁnancing implications. Therefore, in evaluating alternative
programmes it is important to account for their impact on the personal distribution of disposable
income and welfare.
This paper develops an empirically-based, heterogeneous-agent, equilibrium life-cycle model incor-
porating both education and criminal choices. Its goal is to provide a framework in which to analyse the
eﬀectiveness in terms of cost to the taxpayer and the welfare implications of alternative policies which
directly or indirectly impact on crime. We apply the model to the study of property crime which is
more likely to be driven by economic decisions, then, for example, homicide or rape.
The model has two main sources of heterogeneity. Agents diﬀer in: 1) innate, observed ability and
2) initial wealth. Agents self-select themselves into education on the basis of these diﬀerences and, upon
entering the labour market, decide whether to engage in criminal activity on a period-by-period basis.
We use PSID, NIPA and CPS data to estimate the parameters of a production function with dif-
ferent types of human capital and to approximate a distribution of permanent heterogeneity. These
estimates are used to pin down some of the model’s parameters. We also use PSID data to estimate the
relative importance of ability in diﬀerent education groups. The model is calibrated to match education
enrolments both in the aggregate and by measured ability, aggregate (property) crime rates and some
features of the wealth distribution.
4The ﬁgure comes from Maguire and Pastore (1995) and is at the lower end of available estimates. Section 4 reports
alternative estimates.
5In fact, the case for the use of models allowing for equilibrium eﬀects in policy analysis has been recently argued
by various authors in diﬀerent ﬁelds. See, among others, Abraham (2001), Lee (2001),Lee and Wolpin (2004), Cunha,
Heckman, and Navarro (2004) and Gallipoli, Meghir, and Violante (2004)
2We compare the implications and eﬀectiveness of two policies: the ﬁrst, an increase in the prison
term by 1.2 months, the second, a subsidy towards high school completion of roughly 8% of average
earnings per year of school. This amount is the same as the size of a well-known small scale program - the
Quantum Opportunity Program - which provided extra support and high school graduation incentives
aimed at children from a disadvantaged background6. We compare the eﬀect of an unconditional subsidy
paid to all high school graduates to a means-tested one aimed at students in the lowest 35% percentile
of the wealth distribution. To control for heterogeneity we also experiment with assignment of agents
to a treatment and control group.
The increase in the prison term reduces the aggregate crime rate by 4.2% and marginally expands
the stock of inmates and the associated expenditure. As a consequence, the proportional labor tax rate
has to increase marginally (from 27% to 27.03%) to ﬁnance the increased cost. The impact of the policy
is eﬀectively the same both in partial and in general equilibrium.
Financing an unconditional subsidy to high school completion calls for the same increase in the
labor tax rate despite the fact that, in general equilibrium, the absolute cost of the intervention is twice
as large as in the case of an increase in the prison sentence. The increase in eﬃciency and revenues
makes the tuition policy basically self-ﬁnancing. Furthermore, the tuition subsidy is more than twice
as eﬀective in terms of crime reduction. The associated fall in the crime rate is a sizeable 9%. The
intuition behind the result is that, in equilibrium, the subsidy shifts lower ability people, who have a
higher propensity to committing crime, out of the high school dropouts group. At the same time, it
increases the proportion of people with relatively higher ability in the high school dropouts group. These
are the people whose opportunity cost of attending high school goes up more in response to the increase
in the relative wage of high school dropouts. Since education and skills are substitutes in their eﬀect on
crime rates, this reallocation is highly eﬀective. The importance of this composition eﬀect is apparent in
partial equilibrium. While the policy induces a much larger fall in the number of high school dropouts,
the ability composition of the pool of high school dropouts does not improve at unchanged prices. As a
result the crime rate falls by only 3%.
The same subsidy paid only to students in the lowest 35% percentile of the wealth distribution
goes a long way in reducing the crime rate at roughly one third of the cost relative to an equivalent
unconditional subsidy. The aggregate crime rate falls by 6% in general equilibrium while the increase
6See Hahn, Leavitt, and Aaron (1994) and Taggart (1995) for a discussion of the program and its eﬀects
3in eﬃciency implies the policy can be ﬁnanced at a marginally lower labor tax rate relative to the
benchmark. The mechanism at play and the diﬀerences between partial and general equilibrium are
similar to the unconditional subsidy experiment.
Conducting the same means tested experiment but randomized over a treatment and a control group
allows us to compare the predictions of our model to the outcome of actual randomized programs such
as the Quantum Opportunities Program. The average crime rate over the life cycle is between 14 and
15% for the control group and half as much for people in the treated group which took up the subsidy.
This is broadly consistent with the ﬁndings by Hahn, Leavitt, and Aaron (1994) in their follow-up study
among QOP participants one year after the end of the program. The proportion of people reporting
being involved with the police at least once is 6% for the treated group against 13% among controls.
The model is in the tradition of economic models of crime which goes back to Becker’s (1968) seminal
contributions. There is an extensive body of empirical literature testing the main prediction of the
theory that both market returns and the expected punishment are signiﬁcant determinants of criminal
choices. The eﬀect of market returns upon crime is well established: see for example Grogger (1998)
and Freeman (1999) who surveys earlier empirical studies. More recent work includes Gould, Weinberg,
and Mustard (2002), Machin and Meghir (2004) and Raphael and Ludwig (2003). Concerning the eﬀect
of the expected punishment, Levitt (1997) and Levitt (1996) ﬁnds signiﬁcant elasticity of crime rates
respectively to expenditure on police and the length of the expected prison term. Finally, the existence
of a relationship between crime and education is documented by Lochner and Moretti (2004).
Imrohoroglu, Merlo, and Rupert (2004) are the ﬁrst to study jointly the eﬀect of changes in market
returns and in the expected punishment within a calibrated, life-cycle, general equilibrium model of crime
choice. Their model is remarkably eﬀective in accounting for the evolution of the US property crime rate
over the last twenty-ﬁve years on the basis of changes in wage inequality, employment opportunities,
age distribution and expected punishment. The focus of their analysis is positive. With the aim of
accounting for changes in the crime rate, they take the education distribution parametrically and let
it vary according to its evolution in the data over the relevant period. Our focus is more normative.
For this reason, we endogenize investment in education and the marginal returns to education. We also
distinguish between ability to earn and education, and look at how selection into education depends
on ability. The aim is to compare the relative cost-eﬀectiveness of early-intervention policies, such as
education policies, with ex post forms of intervention, such as increased punishment. Cozzi (2004) also
4uses a calibrated equilibrium model to investigate the extent to which diﬀerences in poverty and labor
market opportunities can rationalize the higher crime rates among African-American males.
Imrohoroglu, Merlo, and Rupert (2000) endogenize police expenditure and the degree of redistribu-
tion by adding a political economy dimension to an equilibrium model of crime. Crime rates, police
expenditure and redistribution are determined by the initial distribution of earning abilities and the ap-
prehension technology as the joint outcome of majority voting. The model is able to account for several
feature of US data, such as the positive correlation between police expenditure and redistribution and
the lack of correlation between redistribution and crime.
Finally Donohue and Siegelman (2004) assess the cost-eﬀectiveness of alternative policies aimed at
tackling crime, including social policies. Their cost-beneﬁt analysis, though, relies on elasticities from
existing empirical studies and is thus necessarily static and partial equilibrium.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 discusses the
estimation strategy while the calibration is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 simulates the model and
discusses the eﬀect of alternative policies. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Economic model
2.1 Environment
The model has an overlapping generation structure. Time is discrete.
Demographics: The economy is populated by a continuum of individuals. At each date a new
cohort of unit mass starts life. We denote by j ∈ J the age of an individual. Individuals are born
at age zero, cannot work beyond the compulsory retirement age jr and die at age ¯ j. The conditional
probability of surviving from age j to j + 1 is λj and the unconditional probability of surviving up to
age j > 0 is Λj = Π
j−1
s=0λs.7







where cj denotes consumption at age j. is
j and dc
j are indicator functions. The former equals one if the
individual is in education at age j while the latter assumes value one for an agent engaged in crime at
7By the law of large numbers, Λj is also the mass of agents of age j in the population.
5age j. They are zero otherwise. The felicity function is
u(cj,is
j,dc










The parameters ψj(θ) captures the (dis)utility of the eﬀort associated with education for a student
with measured ability θ. The parameter χ captures the (dis)utility of engaging in crime other than the
opportunity cost stemming from foregone market returns. We have chosen this speciﬁcation since the
ﬂexibility it provides turns out to be crucial to match enrolment rates by ability and the (local) elasticity
of crime to expected punishment observed in the data.
Agents do not value their oﬀsprings’ welfare and discount the future at rate β.
Education: Educational attainment e can take values in E = {e0,e1,e2}.8 To achieve education
level en an agent has to be in school up to age jn with jn+1 > jn and j0 = 0. Hence ed, the number of
years of education, takes values in ED = {0,1,...,j2}. We denote by is
j ∈ {0,1} the choice to study or
not at age j ≤ j2, with is
j = 1 if the individual is in education and zero otherwise. The direct per-period
out of pocket cost (fee) of studying towards a degree e is fe and the utility of being in education en,
ψj(θ), is constant for any jn−1 < j ≤ jn Students who start a course of study are assumed to be
committed to it till its end. Agents who abandon education cannot go back to school at a later date.
After completing school, agents enter the labour force. Market productivity increases only with the
completion of an additional level of education.
Crime choice: Education and retirement are incompatible with crime but all agents in the labour
force can choose to engage in criminal activities regardless of their employment status9. We denote by
dc
j ∈ {0,1} the choice to engage or not in crime at age j < jr, with dc
j = 1 if the individual engages
in crime and zero otherwise. Criminal activity amounts to theft. In the current version of the model,
only workers can be robbed, while students and pensioners cannot10. For a victim being the target of a
theft involves losing a fraction α of post-tax labour income. This is equivalent to say that workers face
a random, multiplicative shock v with support Ψ = {1 − α,1} to their post-tax labour income. The
probability of being the victim of a crime is πv = Pr(v = 1 − α). For simplicity we assume criminals
cannot target their victims and each of them obtains a fraction α of the average post-tax labour income.
8These correspond to “less than high school,” “high school” and “at least college.”
9This is the same assumption as in Imrohoroglu, Merlo, and Rupert (2004). It is consistent with evidence reported in
Merlo (2001) that 71% of state prisoners in 1979 were employed prior to their conviction.
10This will be relaxed in a future draft.
6An agent engaged in crime in the current period is apprehended and sent to jail with probability
πa. The length of the jail sentence is τ periods, starting from the current one. A convicted criminal
keeps both her assets and the proceeds from her last crime, but she cannot access them while in jail.
No optimising choice takes place while in jail and utility is exogenously given and equal to ¯ u.
Endowments: Agents cannot hold a job while in education. Once they have left education and
entered the labour market, the supply labour their unit labour endowment inelastically. An agent’s
labour supply is subject to a multiplicative i.i.d. employment shock equal to 0 < l < 1 with probability
πu > 0 and one with probability 1 − πu.11. Therefore the actual labour supply l can take values in
L = {1,l}.
The eﬃciency associated with an agent’s labour supply l is
hj (θ,e) = exp(θ + ξj (e)), (2)
where θ ∈ Θ is an agent’s innate level of ability. In each generation, the share of individuals with innate
ability θ is η(θ) with
R
Θ η (θ) = 1.
Production technology: Firms are identical and use human and physical capital to produce output
according to the production function
Q(H,K) = H1−αKα, (3)
where H and K denote, respectively, the stocks of human and physical capital. The human capital










of the stocks of human capital Hn associated with education level edn. Workers with the same level of
educational attainement are perfect substitutes. Physical capital depreciates at the exogenous rate δ.
Market arrangements: Markets for factors of production and the ﬁnal good are competitive.
There are no state-contingent markets to insure against income risk, but workers can self-insure by
saving into the risk-free asset. They also face an exogenous borrowing limit a0 ≥ ¯ a, where a0 denotes
the stock of riskless asset at the beginning of the next period.. Assets of agents who die before age ¯ j
11This way of modelling unemployment shocks is the same as in Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2003). It allows
us to contain the computational burden by using a time interval of a year in our calibration while still being able to
accommodate a shorter unemployment duration. The latter is around one quarter for the US.
7are distributed to the newborns in such a way that the cross-sectional distributions of wealth across
deceased and newborn agents coincide12.
We denote by w(e) the wage per eﬃciency unit of labour of a worker with education e and by ˆ r the
riskless interest rate.
Government: The government administers a pay-as-you-go pension system, the criminal justice
system, spends on wasteful public expenditure and transfers and collects taxes. It balances the budget
at all times.
In each period, it pays a pension beneﬁt p to each pensioner and bears a total cost m for each
convicted criminal. The government also pays a yearly subsidy sube (a) to a student with wealth a
studying for a degree leading to education level e. Both pension beneﬁts and student subsidies are
tax-exempt while labour and capital income are taxed at proportional rates tl and tk respectively.
In the model benchmark, once the transfers and the criminal justice systems have been ﬁnanced,
any excess tax revenue is spent on non-valued public expenditure G.
Timing: The timing of events is as follows. At the beginning of each period potential students decide
whether to enter the labour market in the current period and all workers draw their labour supply and
decide whether to engage in criminal activity or not. At this point criminals may be arrested. At the
end of period agents receive their labour income or transfers and decide how much to consume and
save13.
2.2 Recursive Representation
The consumers’ optimization problem admits a recursive representation (see Gallipoli (2005) for proofs).
The individual state is fully characterized by age j, the worker’s type associated with innate ability θ,
completed years of education e, beginning-of-period asset holdings a, the labour supply realization l and
the victimization shock v.
Let Ez denote the expectation operator with respect to the probability distribution of z. Let us also
denote by r = (1−tk)ˆ r the post-tax interest rate equals and by yj (θ,e,l) an agent’s ﬂow of consumable
resource other than ﬁnancial income. Let the superscripts s, nc, na, a, pr and r index respectively
students, non-criminal, non-apprehended criminal, criminals apprehended in the current period, agents
already in prison at the beginning of the period and pensioners. Then disposable non-ﬁnancial “income”
12The details of the mechanism generating bequests are discussed in Section 4.
13Apprehended criminals do not supply any labour in the market. Payment of labour income, net of any losses due to
crime, are paid at the end of each period before optimal consumption levels are chosen.




> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
sube (a) − De if i = s
(1 − tl)(1 − v)w(e)hj (θ,e) if i = nc
(1 − tl)(1 − v)w(e)hj (θ,e) + α¯ y if i = na
α¯ y if i = a
0 if i = pr
p if i = r.
(5)
Students and pensioners do not pay taxes on their ﬂow of consumable resources. Agents engaged in
crime in the current period receive their current illegal income α¯ y. If apprehended they go to jail before
receiving their labour income labour. Agents who are not in jail in the current period receive their
labour income net of taxes but can be robbed of a share v of it. The associated dynamic budget identity





a(1 + r) + yi − c if i 6= pr
a(1 + r) + yi if i = pr.
Given the borrowing constraint and the lack of a bequest motive, the individual maximization prob-
lem is also subject to the constraints
a0 ≥ ¯ a, a0
¯ j ≥ 0, a0 given (6)
The value function of a current student satisﬁes the Bellman equation
V s
j (θ,en,a) = max
c
u(c) + ψj(θ) + βλjV s
j+1(θ,en,a0) (7)
if jn < j < jn+1 and
V s
j (θ,en,aj) = max
c u(c) + ψj(θ) + βλj max{V s
j+1(θ,en+1,a0),ElV w
j+1(θ,en+1,a0,l)} (8)
otherwise. The superscripts s and w index respectively students and workers. A student chooses con-
sumption optimally subject to her budget constraint. Furthermore, in the year following the completion
of its current education course the student has to choose optimally whether to study further or enter the
9labour force before knowing her current labour supply realization. Since the highest attainable degree
is college, the student’s problem is subject to the terminal condition V s
j2 (θ,e,a) = ElV w
j2 (θ,e,a,l).
If one denotes by V nc the value function of a worker not engaged in crime and by V c the value
function of a criminal gross of the cost of crime χ, the problem of a labour force participant can be
written as
V w
j (θ,e,a,l) = max
©
V c




After observing her labour supply realization the agent chooses whether to engage or not in crime. In
the former case she is apprehended with probability α and her value function is
V c
j (θ,e,a,l) = (1 − πa)EvV na
j (θ,e,a,l) + πaV a
j (θ,e,a,l).












Finally, the value function of an agent who is out of jail in the current period - i.e. i = nc,na - is
given by
V i








The agent is subject to the random shock v associated with being robbed and is uncertain abour her
next-period labour supply realization.
2.3 Stationary Equilibrium
The equilibrium concept we use is that of recursive, stationary, competitive equilibrium following Stokey,
Lucas, and Prescott (1989). To streamline notation we denote by s ∈ S the vector of state variables
(θ,e,a,l) ∈ Θ × E × A × L and denote by capital letters aggregates of individual quantities denoted by
the corresponding small case letter. With some abuse of notation, we use integrals even when summing
14Note that a model period is one year. When the prison term is longer than a year we assume that an apprehended
criminal receives utility ¯ u for the entire year in which she enters jail and the remaining fraction of the following year.
After leaving jail her labour supply is reduced according to the remaining fraction of the year and is subject to the same
multiplicative shock as any other worker.
10over discrete variables.
Deﬁnition 1 For a given set of government policies {τ,p,G,sube (a),tl,tk} and an apprehension prob-
ability πa, a recursive stationary equilibrium is a collection of value functions V i
j , individual decision
rules {is
j,dc






: S × Ψ → R, decision rules {K,Hn} for ﬁrms, prices {r,wen},
time-invariant measures µi
j : S → [0,1], a victimization probability πv and an average labour income ¯ y
such that:




j (s)} for i 6= pr solve the set of problems (7)-(11) and V i
j
are the associated value functions. Moreover, a
0pr
j (s,v) = (1 + r)a.
2. Given {r,wen} , K and Hn satisfy
r + δ = FK (12)
and
w(en) = FHn. (13)







Q − δK = C + M + G + F.
4. The government budget is balanced

















15By Walras law, market clearing on the good market and the markets for the three types of labour ensures that the
capital market clears.











The parameters of the model are obtained by a combination of estimation and calibration using data
from the US. We estimate components of the wage process and the aggregate production function.
3.1 Estimating wage equations: skill prices variation and age proﬁles
An important characteristic of the model is that the three types of human capital represent diﬀerent
inputs to the production function, not necessarily perfectly substitutable and may have relative prices
that vary over time in response to changes in either supply or demand for skills.
So as to be able to simulate our model, we need to have a distribution of unobserved heterogeneity
aﬀecting wages and education choices. In the 1972 wave of the PSID several IQ measures were elicited
for households heads and after some examination one of them was deemed to be the most accurate and
released. We use the cross-sectional distribution of such IQ test scores to approximate the permanent
heterogeneity in our sample.
In ﬁgure (3.1) we report the measured IQ densities for the whole 1972 sample and a selected sub-
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Figure 1: Density of IQ measurement from 1972 PSID wave, for the whole sample and a comparable
sub-sample.
Permanent characteristics are only one of the determinants of wages and other dimensions of het-
erogeneity must be analysed. We start by specifying an education speciﬁc wage equation for individual
12i0s (log) wages in period t
lnweit = wet + ge (ageit) + ueit (18)
where wet represents the log of the aggregate price of human capital for education group e and where
ge (ageit) is the education speciﬁc proﬁle of wages. The unobservable component ueit is speciﬁed to be
ueit = be(θi) + mit (19)
where be(θi) is a function of unobserved ﬁxed eﬀects (ability) and mit is measurement error, assumed
iid. Self-selection implies that ﬁxed eﬀects are correlated with both education decisions and observed
wage rates. We use cross-sectional variation to identify the gradients of age and ability by estimating
the following equation on data from the 1972 wave of the PSID separately for each education group
lnwei = cedu + βeduIQ + α1age + α2age2 + εei (20)
where IQ denotes an individual test score, cedu is a constant and εei = mit .





follows that the intercepts of the 3 education speciﬁc equations, cedu, estimate the sum of the age proﬁle
component αe
0 and the education speciﬁc price we1972. Some normalization assumption is necessary to
disentangle these 2 components. The method we use in order to normalize the αe
0 terms (and therefore the
skill prices) is described in more detail when we discuss estimation of aggregate technology parameters.
The quadratic age proﬁles are used in the numerical simulations16.
In order to identify time variation in skill prices we exploit the panel dimension of the PSID data set.
Using equation (18), we can identify the year-speciﬁc (log) changes in wage growth for each education
group by looking at individual (log) wage changes. We acknowledge that the age composition in each
of our education subsamples is diﬀerent. We control for diﬀerent average age in each education group
by estimating a ﬁrst step regression of log real hourly earnings on age and a constant
lnweit = κe + λageeit + residualeit
16In estimating age proﬁles from the 1972 cross-sectional data we ignore cohort eﬀects, which are likely to induce a
downward sloping proﬁle at older ages. At the moment we do not address this issue.
13The residual can be interpreted as the log real hourly earnings of an agent after controlling for the group
age. We then deﬁne the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the residuals as
ηeit = residualeit − residualeit−1
and identify the growth rates of wages in diﬀerent groups by estimating
ηei,year = dummy{year} + ²ei,year (21)
for all years between 1968 and 1997. Standard errors are robust and use cluster adjustment17.
3.2 Wage data and results
For the estimation of wage equations we use cross-sectional data from the 1972 PSID wave. We do not
use individuals associated with the Census low income sample, the Latino sample or the New Immigrant
sample and focus instead on the SRC core sample, which did not suﬀer any systematic additions or
reductions between 1968 and 2001 and was originally representative of the US population. We drop
people with a zero test score because most of them did not take the test seriously enough to be part of
the sample.
The main earnings’ variable in the PSID refers to the head of the household18 and is described as
total labor income of the head19. We use this measure, deﬂated into 1992 dollars by the CPI-U for all
urban consumers. By selecting only heads of household we ignore other potential earners in a family
unit and restrict our attention to people with relatively strong attachment to the labor force. We include
both men and women as well as whites and non-whites20.
Information on the highest grade completed is used to allocate individuals to three education groups:
high school drop-outs (LTHS), high school graduates (HSG) and college graduates (CG). In fact, the
maximum age in the cross-section turns out to be 62. The non constant terms of the age polynomials
from the wage equation are presented in table (1).
17No constant is estimated in this equation.
18In the PSID the head of the household is a male whenever there is a cohabiting male/female couple. Women are
considered heads of household only when living on their own. We do not address the related sample issues explicitly, but
any gender eﬀects are likely to be captured in the ability estimates.
19This includes the labor part of both farm and business income, wages, bonuses, overtime, commissions, professional
practice and others. Labor earnings data are retrospective, as the questions refer to previous year’s earnings, which means
that 1968 data refer to 1967 earnings.
20There is evidence (see Cozzi (2004)) that property crime is done mostly by males. We do not exclude females from
our sample in order to keep consistency between our CPS and PSID data sets.
14Table 1: Results of the estimation for the education speciﬁc cross-sectional equations.
Dependent variable: log hourly earnings
















Figure (2) plots the age proﬁles (in logs) implied by the polynomial estimates for diﬀerent education
groups under the assumption that the constant terms are zero.
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Figure 2: (Log) Age proﬁles of labor eﬃciency by education group - age on the horizontal axis.
A detailed description of our sample selection for the estimation of log changes in HC prices is
reported in the appendix: in brief, we select heads of household aged 25-65 who are not self-employed
and have positive labor income for at least 8 (possibly non continuous) years. The estimated log changes
of price eﬀects wet for diﬀerent education groups are presented in ﬁgure (3).
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Figure 3: Estimated log changes of marginal labor productivity, by education and year.
The growth rates of skills prices are of fundamental importance to help identify human capital
aggregates and the parameters of aggregate technology.
3.3 Using CPS to obtain data for the aggregate production function.
Estimation of the aggregate production function requires the total wage bills for each of the education
groups, and in the general CES case we also need measures of human capital in each of these groups.
We use the March supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS) to obtain these. The CPS is a
monthly survey of about 50,000 households conducted by the Bureau of the Census for the Bureau of
Labor Statistics.21 The wage bills are straightforward to obtain. We just add up the earnings of each
of the three education groups and then scale up the ﬁgures to match the entire US economy.
When we need to estimate a CES production function the issue is more involved because we also
need to estimate the quantity of human capital in each year. To achieve this we need an aggregate price
series for each of the education groups; our estimates from the PSID provide the growth of prices over
time, but a normalisation assumption on each price is necessary. Any normalisation will correspond to
a set of relative prices at a given point in time. However, we still have one degree of freedom: in fact,
after setting the initial relative price of high school and of college graduate labour we can choose the
21The survey has been conducted for more than 50 years. Statistics on the employment status of the population and
related data are compiled by the Bureau Labor Statistics (BLS) using data from the Current Population Survey (CPS).
16utility costs of education to match the proportions going into each of the educational categories. In
other words with unobserved costs the data can be rationalised either with high returns and high costs
or low returns and low costs. The particular normalisation we choose will not aﬀect the simulation of
the policy changes.
The adult universe (i.e., population of marriageable age) is comprised of persons 15 years old and
over for March supplement data and for CPS labor force data. Each household and person has a weight
that we use in producing population-level statistics. The weight reﬂects the probability sampling process
and estimation procedures designed to account for nonresponse and undercoverage.
We use the CPI for all urban consumer (with base year 1992) to deﬂate the CPS earnings data
and drop all observations that have missing or zero earnings. Since the earning data are top-coded
for conﬁdentiality issues, we have extrapolated the average of the top-coded values by using a tail
approximations based on a Pareto distribution.22
Figure (4) reports the number of people working in each year by education group, as reported by
the CPS.
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Figure 4: Employed workers in millions, by education and year
22This procedure is based on a general approach to inference about the tail of a distribution originally developed by Hill
(1975). This approach has been proposed as an eﬀective way to approximate the mean of top-coded CPS earning data by
West (1985); Polivka (2000) provides evidence that this method closely approximates the average of the top-coded tails
by validating the ﬁtted data through undisclosed and conﬁdential non top-coded data available only at the BLS.
17It is clear that some strong and persistent trends towards higher levels of education have characterized
the sample period.
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Figure 5: Total earned labor income, by education and year. Total in billions of 1992 dollars.
Figures (3.3 − 3.3) plot both the average earnings by year and total wage bills in billions of dollars for
the 3 education groups (1=less than High School, 2=High School ﬁnishers, 3=College graduates). Since
CPS earning data until 1996 are top coded we report both the censored mean and a mean adjusted by
using a method suggested by the BLS (see West (1985)) which is based on the original Hill’s estimator
to approximate exponential tails. The diﬀerence between the two averages is larger for the most edu-
cated people who tend to be more aﬀected by top-coding. We include also self-employed people in the
computation of these aggregates; however, their exclusion has almost no eﬀect on the value of the wage
bills and human capital aggregate, as they never represent more than 5% of the working population in
a given education group (and most of the time much less than that).
Given a series of log prices for the HC aggregates, it is possible to divide the wage bills by the
exponentiated value of such prices (whose dynamic behaviour is estimated using PSID data) and ﬁnally
obtain point estimates of the value of eﬃciency weighted total labor supply (human capital aggregates)
by education and year. Our estimates of human capital aggregates are discussed in the next section,
since the speciﬁc normalization we use has an eﬀect on the estimation of some technology parameters.
18Average Earnings − 1992$ − 1=lths 2=hsg 3=cg
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Figure 6: Average earned labor income, by education and year. Average in units of 1992 dollars.
3.4 Aggregate Production Function
In estimating technology parameters, we start from the relatively easier case of Cobb-Douglas technology.











Using NIPA data we ﬁnd the share of capital α to be between 0.3 and 0.35, depending on whether
we correct for housing stocks. The share parameters a and b can be easily expressed as a function of the
aggregate wage bills. If we apply this procedure separately for each year we can pinpoint the evolution
of these functions over the sample period.
Figure (3.4) reports the value of the share parameters (with bounds equal to 2 standard errors) for
the shares associated to each human capital variety. In ﬁgure (3.4) the line that is increasing over the
sample periods represents the College graduates share (1 − a)(1 − b), whereas the downward sloping one
represents the high school drop-outs share a. The almost ﬂat line on top is the high school graduates
share (1 − a)b.
19Figure 7: Labor shares in human capital input of technology, computed using Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation
(with bounds equal to +/- 2 standard errors). Period: 1968-2000. Larger bounds after 1996 are due to
changes in top-coding of income in the CPS.
The time averages of such shares are 0.33 for college graduates, 0.54 for high school graduates and
0.14 for high school dropouts. The evolution of the college graduates labor share over time more than
doubles (from 0.2 to 0.4) whereas the share of less-than-high-school labor falls dramatically from over 0.3
to roughly 0.06. These ﬁndings, together with our PSID estimates of changes in the marginal products
of labor, seem to conﬁrm that major shifts in technology have taken place between the late 1960s and
the end of the century.
We now proceed to relax the restriction of unit elasticity implicit in the Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation











The ratio of marginal products of diﬀerent human capital inputs (MPHCedu) can now be written as
MPHC3/MPHC1 =


























20and terms can be rearranged to obtain expressions involving wage bills, like
WB3/WB1 =























which can be log-linearised and used to obtain estimates of ρ and ratios of share parameters. At this
point the normalisation of skills prices becomes important, as it determines the relative sizes of the
human capital aggregates Hedu.
Remember from equation (20) that the marginal products of human capital types in the cross-
sectional equation based on the 1972 PSID wave cannot be identiﬁed separately from the intercept of
the (log) age proﬁles αedu
0 of the age polynomial. In other words, the amount of log hourly wage that is
attributed to logMPHCedu cannot be distinguished from the amount attributed to a component of the
age polynomial. Therefore a normalizing assumption is needed to disentangle these two components of
wages.
Any normalizing restrictions on the log of the marginal products of each education type (MPHCedu)
have an eﬀect on the estimates of the share parameters of diﬀerent aggregate human capital types in
























˜ H1 are the ratio of human capital aggregates obtained under the assump-
tion that both α1
0 and α2
0 are equal to zero (that is when the constant term κedu in the cross-sectional


























Notice that the ρ parameter in equation (25) is identiﬁed under any rescalings of the ratio H2
H1, because
the log transformation captures any rescaling factor in the constant term. This means that the estimation
of ρ does not change with alternative normalisations of the αedu
0 terms. In a similar way, we can











































where (X,Y,Z) is a vector containing the estimates of the constant terms from the log-linearised esti-
mation of equations (22 − 24).
The above system can provide an estimate of the shares a,b and (1-a-b) as a function of the normal-
ization chosen for the αedu
0 terms. This is linked to the human capital aggregates, which also change
with the αedu
0 terms. An easier notation to write the linear system above is
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and at least a solution to this system exists if and only if rank [A|B] = rank [A]. Therefore we have to







to some arbitrary (normalising)
values, we can solve the system above for a triplet (δ1,δ2,δ3) without having any contraddicting solutions:
22Dependent Variable: log of wage bill ratio
coeﬀ. point estimate S.E.












Table 2: Estimates of unrestricted, log-linearised wage bills ratios equations.
given that the matrix A is of rank 2 (easily checked!) this will be true if and only if X = Y − Z (to
check this, just subtract the third equation from the second), which means that we have a system in 2
equations and 2 unknowns. The restriction on the technology shares exp(δ1) + exp(δ2) + exp(δ3) = 1
guarantees that we can ﬁnd all share parameters. Notice that not all the (X,Y,Z) triplets can guarantee
existence of a solution for this system.
3.5 Estimation results for production function parameters
We estimate a version of equation (25) augmented by a linear time trend for each of the 3 wage bill





is based on the assumption that the terms cedu in equations
(20) identify the relative prices in 1972. To control for possible endogeneity of the human capital inputs
in the production function, we adopt an IV approach with lagged regressors (lags from 1 to 4 periods
back are included in the ﬁrst step). The results of this speciﬁcations, separately estimated, are reported
in table (3.5) with standard errors in parenthesis.
Using a joint estimation approach we are also able to test whether the estimates of the ρ parameters
provided by diﬀerent ratios are statistically diﬀerent from each other (i.e. whether we can reject the
isoelastic assumption)23. The results of such tests are reported in table (3.5).
The tests for equality of the ρ parameters are unable to reject the null hypothesis that the aggregate
technology is isoelastic. We therefore estimate a restricted version of equations (20) in which we restrict
the ρ to be the same for all ratios. The results for this speeciﬁcation are reported in table (3.5).
Our restricted estimate for ρ is approximately .45 which corresponds to an elasticity of substitution
23Using a relatively short time series data set implies relatively large standard errors in our unrestricted estimation,
with the noticeable exception of the edu3/edu2 ratio.
23Testing the isoelastic restrictions
Estimates of ρ being tested (by wage ratios) F-statistic Prob. > F-statistic
ρ(2/1) = ρ(3/2) 0.03 0.8596
ρ(3/2) = ρ(3/1) 0.42 0.5208
ρ(2/1) = ρ(3/1) 0.61 0.4383
ρ(2/1) = ρ(3/1) = ρ(3/1) 0.36 0.7019
Table 3: Tests for equality of elasticities of substitution among human capital inputs
Dependent Variable: log of wage bill ratio
coeﬀ. point estimate S.E.












Table 4: Estimates of restricted, log-linearised wage bills ratios equations.
of around 1.8. Using a simple skilled/unskilled classiﬁcation Katz and Murphy estimate the elasticity
of substitution in production to be 1.41 with a standard error of .150. Heckman, Lochner and Taber
(1998a) report a favorite estimate of the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled equal
to 1.441, whereas Johnson (1970) has an old estimate equal to 1.50. Notice that our elasticity estimate
provides a measure of substitutability between 3 diﬀerent types of workers, rather than two simple skill
groups.
We also estimate a speciﬁcation with only lags larger than 1 to instrument for endogeneity of human
capital aggregates24: this gives a restricted ρ =.354822 (S.E..1974259), which implies a lower elasticity
of 1.55, much closer to the skilled/unskilled estimates of the previous literature.
The share parameters for the CES production function can be identiﬁed by using the constants
estimated from the wage bill ratio equations above. However, one must be careful what normalizing
assumptions are made on the values of the αedu
0 terms in equation (25).
After experimenting with diﬀerent alternatives, we have decided to set the intercept αedu
0 of the log
age proﬁles to values such that the levels of the age proﬁles for diﬀerent education groups have all
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Table 5: Value of the intercept in the (log) age proﬁle polynomial. These values pinpoint human capital
prices and technology shares.





































which can be solved by setting the value of one of the αedu
0 terms to some arbitrary value and solving
equations (30 − 31) for the remaining αedu
0 terms25. The resulting values are reported in table (3.5).
We plug these values from table (3.5) in the system (26 − 28) together with the constants estimated
in the wage bills equations (X=.5943174,Y=-.2503577,Z=-.8446752) reported in table (3.5). Notice that
X ≈ Y − Z (easily check that X − Y + Z = 5943174 + .2503577 − .8446752 ≈ 0) and we know that a
solution exists. The system in levels (not logs) can be written as}
b
a








1 − a − b
a








1 − a − b
b








and solving for a and b we get that a = 1
1+B+A =0.24, b = A
1+B+A =0.41 and (1 − a − b) =0.35.
Notice that after choosing the αedu
0 terms in the age proﬁle, we obtain the relative prices of diﬀerent
human capital in 1972, by using the constant terms cedu estimated in (20). This allows to identify also a





















25Normalised prices of human capital by education group in 1972
α0 constant 1972 (log) price of HC = constant − α0 1972 (level) price of HC
Edu group 1 0 0.21859 0.21859 1.244321
Edu group 2 0.159 0.57754 0.41854 1.51974
Edu group 3 -1.164 -0.1005 1.0635 2.89649
Table 6: This table reports the 1972 normalised human capital prices computed by using constant terms
estimated in the cross-sectional equation with the normalising (log) age intercepts.
series of human capital aggregates which are consistent with the technology parameters. For clarity we
report in table (6) both the constant terms we have estimated for equations (20) and the normalising
αedu
0 obtained from equations (30 − 31). Their diﬀerence pins down a normalised (log) price for each
human capital type in 1972 (the year for which we estimate the cross-sectional equation).
Using the price changes estimated in equations (21) we can obtain a time series of prices and human
capital aggregates (eﬃciency weighted labor supplies) between 1968 and 1997. These series and their
logs are presented in ﬁgure (8).
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Figure 8: Human capital aggregates and associated prices over time, both logs and levels, based on
preferred normalisation.
The price pattern reported in (8) is consistent with a pattern of increasing inequality. The time
series of human capital stocks give an insight on the importance of selection in determining inequality,
especially if we contrast them with the aggregate labor force and wage bills reported in ﬁgures (3.3 − 3.3).
26Despite a doubling of both the total number and wage bill of high school graduates, their human capital
aggregate has been quite ﬂat over the sample period, suggesting that for this group there has been a
reduction in average per worker eﬃciency. A similar conclusion can be drawn for the college graduates,
as their total number went up by almost four times over the sample period, whereas their human
capital aggregate increased by roughly 70%. Big shifts in the distribution of people of diﬀerent ability
over educational outcomes have probably taken place over the sample period.
It is also worth noting that the pattern of HC aggregates is very similar to the labor shares’ dynamics
presented in ﬁgure (3.4) for the Cobb-Douglas case.
4 Calibrating the Benchmark Model
Not all the parameters in our model are estimated. The free parameters are chosen with the objective
to build a numerical counterpart of our model which is able to reproduce selected features of the US
economy.
Given the nature and timing of the choice faced by people wealth plays a pivotal role in determining
equilibrium outcomes. The availability of assets and access to credit to smooth consumption is a crucial
factor in both education and crime decisions. We set time-preference and borrowing limit parameters in
order to obtain a benchmark with an appropriate wealth/income ratio and a share of asset-poor people
in line with the observed share for the target year. The distribution of workers over education outcomes
is equally important, because it determines the relative returns to the education investments. However,
the aggregate education shares are not suﬃcient by themselves to pin down relative returns because
the relative ability of workers is key in determining aggregate human capital inputs in the production
function. Therefore we target not only the aggregate education shares in the target year, but also
education shares by ability. The additional beneﬁt of this calibration approach is that we are able to
assess the composition eﬀects of potential policies by looking at selection over ability as well as wealth.
Finally, the benchmark equilibrium of our model must be able to reproduce the aggregate (property)
crime rate for the target. It is also necessary to restrict the marginal sensitivity of the aggregate crime
rate with respect to the prison sentence to a value that is close to estimates from the empirical literature.
This allows to measure the eﬀects of alternative policies versus the case of a pure stiﬀening of sentences.
We achieve this double objective by calibrating a utility cost of crime composed by 2 elements: a constant
27purely conditional on committing crime and a quantity which is a function of the length of the sentence.
The remainder of this section describes our calibration approach in more detail.
Demographics. Each period represents one full year. An individual is born at age 16 and can
choose whether to work or study. If an individual decides to study, she commits to be in school for two
years until completion of High School. When 18 a High School graduate decides again whether to work
or study for the next 3 years in order to become a College worker. In any case, agents can work only
until age 65, which means that the full working life of a person who starts work at age 16 is 50 years,
whereas it becomes 48 years for High School graduates and only 45 years for College graduates (who
start working at age 22) . The age range in the model is the same as the age range we use in our PSID
sample. The maximum possible age in the model is 95 and there is an age-related probability to die in
each period that we take from the US life tables for 1989-1991.
Preferences. Agents have CRRA preferences and we choose the curvature of their utility to obtain
a coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion of 1.5. The discount factor β is chosen to produce a wealth income
ratio equal to that for US households up t the 99% percentile. Wolﬀ (2000) estimates the value of this
ratio to be roughly 3.45 in 1983. The implied value of the discount factor is 0.967.
Unemployment shocks. Following Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2003) we calibrate the
required search period for an agent who experiences an unemployment shock to match the average
duration of unemployment in the US economy. This is 13.5 weeks, which is roughly 26% of the full-time
employed yearly work hours.We therefore set the labor supply of (temporarily) unemployed people to
l
¯
=0.74. The incidence of unemployment πu (fraction of population experiencing an unemployment spell
in a given year) is set to 17.5% and the model unemployment rate is 0.175 × 0.26 = 4.55% which is the
US average for our sample period.26
Wealth distribution of the youngest. We assume that the wealth distribution among the
youngest corresponds to the distribution of the accidental bequests in the economy. However, no agent
is endowed with negative assets, so we censor the bequests’ distribution at zero and appropriately modify
the average bequest so that the total bequitted wealth is held constant.
Borrowing Limit. The exogenous borrowing limit ¯ a is calibrated to match the share of workers
26At the moment we do not diﬀerentiate employment risk by education, although an interesting extension would be to
include education speciﬁc employment risk.
28(all agents excluding students) with zero or negative wealth. Wolﬀ (2000) provides an estimate of 15.5%
for this share, which implies a borrowing limit of about 46% of average post-tax labor earnings.
Government. We use ﬂat tax rates for both labor and capital income and, following Domeij and
Heathcote (2003), we set tl = 0.27 and tk = 0.4. For simplicity, the pension is assumed to be a constant
lump sum for all agents, regardless of their education and previous earnings. The replacement rate for
the lump-sum is set to 16.4% of average post-tax labor earnings like in Heathcote, Storesletten, and
Violante (2003).
Distribution of permanent characteristic (ability). We use the distribution of IQ test scores
from the 1972 wave of the PSID to approximate the distribution of permanent characteristics (ability)
over the population. For expositional simplicity we split the range of ability in 4 equal-size intervals and
assign agents to such ability bins. The relative share of people in the four bins is diﬀerent: only 1.7% of
the total population are in the lowest ability group (bin 1) which contains people in the left tail of the
distribution plotted in Figure 3.1. Just less than 6.6% of the total population is in bin 2, 48% in bin 3
and ﬁnally 44% in the highest ability group (bin 4).
Direct Cost of Education. The direct cost of college education is chosen to match the value of
tuition costs as a proportion of average pre-tax earning. The National Center for Education Statistics
provides several measures of tuition costs and we use our PSID sample for an estimate of average pre-
tax earnings. Over the sample period the real college tuition costs have been been steadily growing,
increasing from less than 5% to over 15% of our selected measure of earnings. We choose to set the
college tuition costs to be 10% of average post-tax earnings. Given the labor tax rate in our model, this
is equivalent to a college tuition cost roughly equal to 8% of average pre-tax earnings.
For the value of High School direct costs we have set them to be just 1% of average post-tax earnings,
in order to account for expenses incurred for studying equipment and other practicalities. There does
not seem to be not much information on such costs.
Education Enrolment Rates. Eeducation rates are matched both in the aggregate and by
ability groups. The distinction is important because the same aggregate shares are consistent with many
diﬀerent distributions of ability over education and, therefore, many diﬀerent relative marginal returns
between diﬀerent types of labor. Moreover, the policy experiments are likely to alter the distribution of
29Enrolment rates by ability bin
Bin 1 Bin 2 Bin 3 Bin 4 Aggregate rates
Edu 1 0.75 0.5 0.28 0.12 0.24
Edu 2 0.25 0.43 0.57 0.53 0.54
Edu 3 0.00 0.05 0.15 0.35 0.22
Table 7: Shares of workers in diﬀerent education groups by ability (IQ test) bin. Based on our sample
of workers from the 1972 wave of the PSID.
Grossed-up enrolment rates by ability bin
Bin 1 Bin 2 Bin 3 Bin 4 Aggregate rates
Edu 1 0.81 0.56 0.30 0.13 0.25
Edu 2 0.19 0.40 0.58 0.61 0.58
Edu 3 0.00 0.04 0.12 0.26 0.17
Table 8: Grossed-up shares of workers in diﬀerent education groups by ability (IQ test) bin. The values
are grossed-up in equal proportions to replicate the aggregate education shares observed for workers in
the 1980 CPS March supplement.
ability in each education group and it is useful that the benchmark can reproduce the distribution of
ability types over education outcomes. In order to approximate such distribution we use the 1972 wave
of the PSID which provides data on educational attainment of agents as well as their score in an IQ
test. We assign people to 4 diﬀerent ability bins, with bin 1 comprising those with the lowest IQ scores
and bin 4 those with the highest. The education shares for each ability bin and the ensuing aggregate
fractions are reported in table (7).
However, the aggregate education shares based on the 1972 wave of the PSID do not represent the
true shares of aggregate enrolment in the US economy in our sample period27 which are reported in
table (B). In order to reproduce the aggregate education distribution in the economy we gross-up the
1972 rates so that their aggregation gives back the aggregate enrolment rates for the US economy in
198028. The values of the grossed-up education shares by ability are reported in table (8).
We use ability-speciﬁc quasi-linear utility terms ψj(θ) to shift the value of education for diﬀerent
ability bins and match the education shares.
Aggregate Crime Rate and Elasticity of Aggregate Crime Rate to the Expected Prison
Sentence. The aggregate property crime rate for the US in 1980 was 5.6%.29 Furthermore, the evidence
linking increased punishment to aggregate crime rate indicates that the elasticity of property crime with
27One reason for this problem is attrition which can unequally aﬀect people with diﬀerent education in the PSID, altering
the aggregate education shares. Moreover, our sampling procedure is likely to exclude people with low attachment to the
labor market.
28We use 1980 for the aggregate enrolment rates because the education shares in that year lie very close to the sample
averages for the period 1967-2001. The average fraction of workers with no High School degree over the sample period
was 0.232. The fraction of High School graduates was 0.575 and the College graduate share was 0.193.
29The crime rate is a victimization rate and represents a per capita measure of property crime in the US. The data
are from the Uniform Crime Report and are taken from the Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, Bureau of Justice
Statistics. An alternative source of data regarding crime victimisation is the National Crime Victimisation Survey, based
on self-reporting by victims. This study suggests a larger incidence of crime vis-a-vis the UCR data.
30respect to expected punishment ranges from -0.1 to -0.4, see Donohue and Siegelman, 1998. We target an
elasticity of -0.2, following Levitt (2004) who picks this value to account for the increase in incarceration
rates over the 1990s.
We jointly choose the utility in jail ¯ u and the quasi-linear utility term associated to committing
crime so that we match the aggregate crime rate and its elasticity to expected punishment. The average
expenditure per convict in the model is equal to m. According to Maguire and Pastore (1995) the average
expenditure per convict in the US was roughly $ 20,000 in 1992 and went up to $ 26,000 by 1999. These
per-prisoner-costs are roughly 53% of average pre-tax labour earnings from our PSID sample. Donohue
and Siegelman (2004) suggests an even higher cost per prisoner of $ 36,000 for 1993 that would be 90%
of the average pre-tax earnings in our PSID sample. We choose to set average per prisoner costs to 0.53
of average earnings and set m to match this value.
The value of the parameters calibrated in the benchmark are reported in table (35) with the exception
of the utility quasilinear terms associated with the education decisions which are reported in table (B).
Both tables are in the appendix.
5 Numerical Simulations
This section describes the benchmark economy and presents the results of our policy experiments. We
start by describing the main features of our benchmark economy in some detail. All models results are
reported in model units.
5.1 The Benchmark Economy
Education distribution. In our benchmark economy both the aggregate and ability-speciﬁc distri-
bution of people over educational outcomes reproduce the shares in table (8). At the time of the high
school choice wealth seems to matter only for people in the two highest ability bins. Given the relatively
small diﬀerential in wages between high school graduates and dropouts (roughly 8% in our benchmark
simulation, see table 10), people in the lowest ability bins are roughly indeﬀerent between high school
and working. Only for the highest ability group there is a preference for high school30 which introduces
selection based on wealth. In these bins, agents who opt to continue schooling at ages 16 are richer
30This preference is explained by the fact that ability multiplies market prices in this model, and by the fact that many
of the high ability people are bound to progress to college.
31Average wealth of workers and students at age 16 and at age 18
age 16 age 18






















Table 9: Average assets holding of people who choose to work vis-a-vis people who choose to study at
ages 16 and 18. All values are in model units.
overall than those who opt for work. As shown in table 9, in ability bin 3 the average wealth of people
who progress to high school is 11.48 model units compared to just over 1.4 for the people who choose
to work (in this bin high school dropouts account for roughly 30% of the population, see table 8). The
diﬀerence is even starker in ability group 4, where only 13% of people are high school dropouts. In this
group the average wealth of students in 9.7 compared to a very low 0.31 for the dropouts. Given that we
are conditioning on being part of a very high ability group, it is clear that selection is working mostly
through the initial wealth endowment.
Admittedly this result depends on the assumption we are making regarding the borrowing limit of
agents: we are assuming that people can borrow up to 46% of average post-tax labor earnings. Finally,
many of the people who decide to go to high school in the high ability bins are likely to continue onto
college, where tuition costs are higher and the length of the period to be funded longer.
In contrast to the high school decision, no large diﬀerences in wealth are present between people
who decide to work at age 18 and people who decide to progress to a college education. The benchmark
suggests that among college goers selection is based mostly on ability and wealth plays a smaller role31.
This results suggest that selection based on wealth takes place at an earlier stage in life: education
decisions are a sequential process, and by the time of college only for a very small fraction of agents the
decision will depend upon their wealth.
We also ﬁnd that there is almost no diﬀerence in the average ability of college and high school
graduates, which we mostly attribute to the fact that the gradient of ability in college wages is zero in
this model.32
Average earnings and Income by Education. The model is able to replicate some stylised
facts about inequality in earnings and income. Table (10) reports post-tax wage and income, together
31We also measure what share of potential college goers are borrowing constrained at age 18. The only ability bin that
contains borrowing constrained potential college goers is the highest, and even here only 12% of agents are borrowing
constrained. This corresponds to just above 5% of the total of potential college goers.
32See table (1) in the empirical section for an explanation of the zero gradient of IQ on college wages.
32Inequality summary statistics for the benchmark economy
Education
HS dropouts HS Graduates College Graduates
Crime No Crime Crime No Crime Crime No Crime
Average ability 0.948 1.023 1.127 1.160 1.111 1.137
Average wage 1.19 1.72 1.28 1.85 1.37 2.71
Average ability (by edu only) 1.011 1.159 1.137
Average wage (by edu only) 1.63 1.84 2.70
Average income (by edu only) 1.30 2.03 3.07
Table 10: Summary statistics for diﬀerent education groups, by criminal status.
Self-reported criminal participation rates by education status in NLSY (males ages 20-23,1980)
Any income from crime Property crime
years of schooling
Less than 10 years 0.297 (0.035) 0.129 (0.026)
10-11 years 0.337 (0.029) 0.218 (0.026)
12 years 0.244 (0.017) 0.118 (0.013)
more than 12 years 0.174 (0.015) 0.160 (0.015)
Table 11: Property crime includes thefts of at least $ 50 or shoplifting. Standard errors in parenthesis.
The data are taken from table 1, page 825, of Lochner (2004).
with average ability, by criminal and education status. In particular, the relative post-tax income by
education is in line with the long term diﬀerences observed between 1967-1996, suggesting that the
model is doing a good job in capturing inequality in both labor and capital income.
Crime statistics and costs. Empirical evidence suggests that the largest share of property crime is
committed by young, uneducated people. Lochner (2004) provides a large body of evidence documenting
a strong correlation between young age, low education and crime. In table (11) we report some data on
education and crime based on the NLSY, provided by Lochner (2004).
On the basis of this evidence it appears that completing 12 years of schooling does make a large
diﬀerence in the propensity to commit crime. If we take the average crime rate between ages 20 and
23 produced by our benchmark model for diﬀerent education groups, we have that among high school
dropouts the crime rate is 0.35, among high school ﬁnishers it is 0.07 and among college graduates it is
0.10. It seems that our model is slightly overestimating the share of (property) criminals who are high
school dropouts compared to NLSY data and underestimating the share of criminals with at least a high
school degree.33 This is due to the nature of the crime decision, which has no long term consequences
for those apprehended. Introducing some form of stigma, like in Imrohoroglu, Merlo, and Rupert (2004)
would probably reduce this discrepancy. It must be also noted that our measure of crime rate is in fact
a victimization rate based on the whole population in a certain age group, whereas the NLSY data’s
33NLSY data might somehow underestimate the true rates as individual are self-reporting their crime activity.
33Crime rates by ability bin and education group - benchmark
Education group
ability bin High school dropouts High school graduates College graduates
bin 1 (lowest) 0.26 0.17 0.024
bin 2 0.19 0.033 0.016
bin 3 0.17 0.009 0.009
bin 4 (highest) 0.11 0.025 0.009
aggregate 0.165 0.019 0.01
Table 12: Simulated crime rates by ability bins and education groups in the benchmark economy. The
aggregate refers to the education-speciﬁc average of diﬀerent abilities weighted by the relative size of
each ability bin.
population is just the sample population in a given year.
The distribution of crime rates by ability bins and education group in our model shows large selection
eﬀects for the crime choice. Table (12) summarizes such crime rates in our benchmark. Given ability,
crime rates drop dramatically as the labour market opportunity cost increases. This eﬀect has been
already documented by Machin and Meghir (2004).
Increasing opportunity cost seems to work mostly through education, although there are sizeable
eﬀects in ability, especially in the group of high school ﬁnishers.
The aggregate crime rate in the benchmark economy is 5.6%. The aggregate prison expenditure is
equal to 0.43, that is 0.3% of aggregate output and 1% of total tax revenues.
5.2 The Eﬀects of Increased Punishment
We have calibrated utility in jail in order to obtain a (local) elasticity of aggregate crime rate with
respect to expected prison term of roughly -0.2 (see Levitt (2004)). In order to assess the eﬀects of
increasing the expected prison term in our model, we run some experiments in which we increase the
prison term.
In the ﬁrst of such experiments, we increase the expected prison sentence by 0.1 units of a year,
which is equivalent to 1.2 months. This change increases the expected sentence for an apprehended
criminal from 12.6 months in jail to 13.8 months in jail. It is worth pointing out that in our model
apprehension corresponds to incarceration. However, based on the Sourcebook of Crime Statistics, only
66% percent of cleared property crime cases reaching court end up in positive jail sentences. Therefore,
expected sentences of 12.6 and 13.2 months correspond to average dispensed sentences of, respectively,
19.1 and 20.9 months.
Increasing the expected jail term to 13.2 months generates, in general equilibrium, a drop of the
34Crime rates by ability bin and education group - jail term 13.2 months (G.E.)
Education group
ability bin High school dropouts High school graduates College graduates
bin 1 (lowest) -0.03 0 -0.02
bin 2 -0.02 0 0
bin 3 -0.01 0 0
bin 4 (highest) 0 0 0
aggregate -0.01 0 0
Table 13: Diﬀerences with respect to benchmark (absolute changes) in simulated crime rates by ability
bins and education groups for economy with expected prison term of 13.2 months - G.E.
Enrolment rates by ability bin - jail term 13.2 months (G.E.)
Bin 1 Bin 2 Bin 3 Bin 4 Aggregate rates
Edu 1 -0.06 -0.01 0 0 0
Edu 2 0.05 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0
Edu 3 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0
Table 14: Diﬀerences with respect to benchmark (absolute changes) in shares of workers in diﬀerent
education groups by ability (IQ test) bin, given a 1.2 months increase in prison term
aggregate crime rate to 5.3%. The eﬀect of the higher punishment, as summarised in table (13), is to
reduce the crime rate among high school dropouts, especially in lower ability groups.
The increased punishment also generates a change in the ability speciﬁc distribution of education.
Table 14 reports the new values. In the lowest ability group the number of high school dropouts goes
down from 81% in the benchmark to 75% in the new equilibrium. Also in the second lowest ability group
high school dropouts decrease from 56% to 55%. We attribute this change to a stronger disincentive
to use crime as a consumption smoothing device. Since low skill people have a higher propensity to
engage in crime for given educational attainments, this improves the ability composition of the pool of
high school dropouts further reducing the crime rate for this education group. The aggregate education
distribution is roughly unaﬀected given the low number of people in the ﬁrst two ability bins.
No large eﬀects in other dimensions take place in the new equilibrium. The aggregate prison expen-
diture goes up to 0.45, and it goes up marginally as a share of total tax revenue to 1.1% . Additional
costs are paid through increases in the labor tax rate which is almost unchanged at 27.03%. Per-capita
output, after subtracting the prison costs, is almost unchanged with respect to the benchmark (up by
0.02%). The eﬀects of the change in prison term length are very similar in partial equilibrium, meaning
that no signiﬁcant price eﬀect is induced by this policy change.
We also experiment with an even longer prison term, pushing up the expected sentence by a further
1.2 months to 15 months. The aggregate crime rate goes down only marginally in this case, to 5.27%.
In the second ability bin there is a larger drop in high school dropouts’ share, which goes down to 51%
35of the total. However the aggregate prison costs increase to 0.491 or 1.2% of total tax revenues and, as
a consequence, the labor tax rate increases to 27.09%.
5.3 Subsidizing High School Completion
The second experiment we carry out involves subsidizing high school completion. A very well known
experiment - the Quantum Opportunities Program - was carried out on a small scale along similar lines
by the Department of Labor and the Ford Foundation in two waves: a ﬁrst one between 1989 and
1993 and a later one between 1995 and 2001. The program was targeted at adolescents from families
receiving public assistance. The experiment, appropriately randomized, oﬀered learning support and
cash incentives, from grade nine through to high school graduation, to students in the treatment group.
It involved a “salary” starting at $1 and rising to $1.33 per each hour of “activity” the student attended
up to a ceiling plus a bonus of $100 for each 100 program hours for completing activities34. An amount
equal to the earned stipend was also deposited in an accrual account and paid to the enrollee conditionally
upon completion of her high school degree. The total cost of the program was $3130 per student per
year, of which $2150 represented the direct payment to the student and the remaining amount the cost
of the resources (teaching support and equipment) the student had access to.
Hahn, Leavitt, and Aaron (1994) report that the program reduced the crime rate in the year after
the end of the program by roughly 50% (from 13% to 6%) among participants relative to the control
group. As discussed in Donohue and Siegelman (2004), there are three main reasons why these numbers
must be taken with care. First, the data refer to the subjects self-reporting about being in trouble
with the police. Secondly, the diﬀerence in self-reported crime rates between the two groups was only
signiﬁcant at 12% according to Donohue and Siegelman’s (2004) calculations. Third, the signiﬁcance
decreases further if data from the unsuccessful Milwaukee trial, which the analysts dropped from their
calculations, were included.
The experiment in this section diﬀers from the Quantum Opportunity Program as it is not targeted
at students from a disadvantaged background, but consists in giving all students attending high school
a subsidy equal to 7.6 per cent of average labour earnings, which corresponds to the ratio between $
3130 and average labour earnings in the data from 1995, one of the central years in which the program
was run. Since students are likely to have beneﬁted from the teaching support as well as the transfer,
34The maximum number of program hours was 750 divided between 250 hours of academic support, 250 hours of cultural
and developmental activities and 250 hours of service activities, such as community service projects.
36Enrolment rates by ability bin - non means-tested (non M.-T.) HS subsidy (P.E.)
Bin 1 Bin 2 Bin 3 Bin 4 Aggregate rates
Edu 1 -.13 -.23 -.15 -.05 -.11
Edu 2 .12 .23 .15 .03 .10
Edu 3 .01 0 0 .02 .01
Table 15: Diﬀerences with respect to benchmark (absolute changes) in shares of workers in diﬀerent
education groups by ability (IQ test) bin, given a non means-tested high school subsidy (partial equi-
librium).
Crime rates by ability bin and education group - non M.-T. HS subsidy in P.E.
Education group
ability bin High school dropouts High school graduates College graduates
bin 1 (lowest) .01 .01 -.01
bin 2 .02 .04 -.01
bin 3 .04 .02 0
bin 4 (highest) .01 .01 0
aggregate .03 .02 0
Table 16: Diﬀerences with respect to benchmark (absolute changes) in simulated crime rates by ability
bins and education groups in the P.E. non means-tested high school tuition subsidy experiment. The
aggregate refers to the education-speciﬁc average of diﬀerent abilities weighted by the relative size of
each ability bin.
we choose to use the total cost of the program which reﬂects the actual market value of the resources
enjoyed by a student.
The partial equilibrium eﬀects of this simple tuition subsidy are limited in terms of crime reduction:
the aggregate crime rate goes down to 5.38% This is despite a huge shift in the distribution over
education conditional on ability. The eﬀects in terms of high school completion are extremely large, as
reported in table 15.
The total number of high school dropouts in the economy drops by more than 40%. The increase
in total tax revenues due to the job reallocation more than compensates the costs of the program.
Aggregate prison costs plus the costs of the tuition programme are just 1% of total tax revenues. Per-
capita output, after subtracting jail costs, is 1.2% higher than in the benchmark: as more people have
access to labor markets with higher returns total output grows substantially. As shown in table 16, the
positive eﬀect in terms of crime associated to moving people away from the pool of high school droputs is
counterbalanced by a sharp rise in crime rates among the remaining high school dropouts. This increase
in crime rate among dropouts is largely due to bigger inequality, since higher earnings for those who
move into higher education are not matched by higher earnings for those left behind.
In table 17 we report percentage changes (with respect to the benchmark) in between-group diﬀer-
ences in average wage, ability, marginal returns35 and post-tax income. Given that mostly wealth-poor
35The diﬀerences in marginal returns to labor are unchanged by construction in this P.E. experiment.
37Changes in inequality (%). Non means-tested H.S. tuition experiment - P.E.
HS graduates vs HS dropouts College graduates vs HS graduates
Average ability diﬀerence -6.1 0
Labor price diﬀerence 0 0
Average wage diﬀerence -4.8 1.2
Average income diﬀerence 54.8 1.0
Table 17: Change with respect to benchmark (percentage) in various between-group diﬀerences. La-
bor prices are marginal returns per eﬃciency unit of labor, obtained from the production technology.
Experiment: non means-tested HS tuition subsidy - P.E.
agents remain in the drop-outs group, there is an increase of more than 50% in the income diﬀerential
between high school graduates and dropouts. This additional inequality explains the substantial increase
in crime rates among dropouts. The increase in crime rates among high school graduates follows from
the fact that poorer and less able people now represent a larger share of this education group.
In partial equilibrium the increase in inequality seems to dampen the eﬀectiveness of the HS tuition
policy.
In the general equilibrium case things are rather diﬀerent. The drop in crime rate is quite large with
respect to the benchmark, as well as the experiments with higher jail terms. Table 18 reports the crime
rates by ability and education for the G.E. high school subsidy experiment.
What drives the result is a signiﬁcant composition eﬀect. As it is clear from Table 19 the proportion
of ability 1 people among high school dropouts falls by 8 percentage points (against 6 in the prison
term experiment) while the proportion of ability 2 people increases by 4 percentage points (it falls by
5 percentage points in the prison term case). Since the average worker in ability bin 2 has half the
propensity to engage in crime than the average ability 1 worker, the crime rate falls more than in the
case of an increase in the prison term. This improvement in the ability mix among high school dropouts
produces an equilibrium aggregate crime rate of 5.1%, with a drop twice as large as the ones induced by
the increased punishment and by the same tuition subsidy in partial equilibrium. Relative both to the
prison term experiment and to the partial equilibrium case, this favorable composition eﬀect is driven
by changes in the relative price of skill between high school dropouts and high school graduates. Such
relative price is basically unchanged in the prison term experiment. However, the labor price diﬀerences
substantially shrink in the case of the tuition subsidy. This increases the share of people within ability
group 2 who are high school dropout, because higher ability people have a higher opportunity cost of
attending high school relative to those in ability group 1. Education and skills are substitutes in reducing
the crime rate and the equilibrium change in market prices shifts towards high school the people with
38Crime rates by ability bin and education group - HS subsidy in G.E.
Education group
ability bin High school dropouts High school graduates College graduates
bin 1 (lowest) .01 0 -.02
bin 2 -.02 0 0
bin 3 -.01 0 0
bin 4 (highest) 0 0 0
aggregate -.02 0 0
Table 18: Diﬀerences with respect to benchmark (absolute changes) in simulated crime rates by ability
bins and education groups in the G.E. high school tuition subsidy experiment. The aggregate refers to
the education-speciﬁc average of diﬀerent abilities weighted by the relative size of each ability bin.
Enrolment rates by ability bin - HS subsidy (G.E.)
Bin 1 Bin 2 Bin 3 Bin 4 Aggregate rates
Edu 1 -.08 .04 0 -.02 0
Edu 2 .04 -.04 0 .01 -.01
Edu 3 .04 0 0 .01 .01
Table 19: Diﬀerences with respect to benchmark (absolute changes) in shares of workers in diﬀerent
education groups by ability (IQ test) bin, given a non-means tested high school subsidy (general equi-
librium).
the higher propensity to engage in crime.
Finally, in table 20, we document a small decrease in labor income inequality and a larger decrease
in total income inequality that reinforces the drop in disaggregated crime rates.
The drop in income inequality is due to the adjustment in prices that was barred in partial equi-
librium. Inequality in total income between HS graduates and dropouts is roughly one third smaller in
G.E. than it was in partial equilibrium.
In this equilibrium the aggregate prison costs in model units are 0.40, or 0.94% of total tax revenues.
The high school subsidy program costs roughly 0.5% of total tax revenues, which gives a total cost
of roughly 1.44% of total tax revenues. However, in the new equilibrium total tax revenues are 0.4%
larger than in the benchmark, despite the proportional labor tax rate increases by the same amount (to
27.03%) as in the case of longer prison term. Per-capita output, after subtracting jail costs, goes up by
0.5%. The increase in eﬃciency and revenues makes the policy eﬀectively self-ﬁnancing. Yet, for the
Changes in inequality (%). Non means-tested H.S. tuition experiment - G.E.
HS graduates vs HS dropouts College graduates vs HS graduates
Average ability diﬀerence 12.2 31.8
Labor price diﬀerence -16.7 -1.4
Average wage diﬀerence -4.8 -1.2
Average income diﬀerence -5.5 -2.9
Table 20: Change with respect to benchmark (percentage) in various between-group diﬀerences. Labor
prices are marginal returns are per eﬃciency unit of labor, obtained from the production technology.
Experiment: non means-tested HS tuition subsidy - G.E.
39Enrolment rates by ability bin - means-tested HS subsidy (P.E.)
Bin 1 Bin 2 Bin 3 Bin 4 Aggregate rates
Edu 1 -.06 -.14 -.15 -.04 -.1
Edu 2 .05 .13 .15 .03 .09
Edu 3 .01 0 0 .01 .01
Table 21: Diﬀerence in shares of workers (absolute changes relative to benchmark) in diﬀerent edu-
cation groups by ability (IQ test) bin, given a means-tested high school subsidy intervention (partial
equilibrium).
Crime rates by ability bin and education group - means-tested H.S. subsidy in P.E.
Education group
ability bin High school dropouts High school graduates College graduates
bin 1 (lowest) .01 .02 -.01
bin 2 -.03 .06 -.01
bin 3 .04 .02 0
bin 4 (highest) .01 .01 0
aggregate .02 .02 0
Table 22: Diﬀerences with respect to benchmark (absolute changes) in simulated crime rates by ability
bins and education groups for the P.E. means-tested high school tuition subsidy experiment. The
aggregate refers to the education-speciﬁc average of diﬀerent abilities weighted by the relative size of
each ability bin.
same change in the tax rate, the eﬀect in terms of crime reduction is roughly double as for the increase
in prison term.
5.4 Restricting the Target Population: a Means-Tested High School Subsidy
Another step towards designing an experiment comparable to the Quantum Opportunity Programme
is to restrict the target population. The QOP was intended to help students from disadvantaged back-
grounds: in this sense the population eligible for ﬁnancial support was not the universe of all potential
students as in the previous experiment. An across-the-board subsidy (i.e. not conditional on available
resources) corresponds to a giveaway to many inframarginal individuals who would attend high school
in any case, and its per-dollar eﬀectiveness is likely to be smaller than a targeted intervention.
It is interesting to replicate the previous experiment with a restriction on eligibility. We do this by
making the subsidy available only to agents with an inital assets endowment below the 35th percentile
of the initial assets distribution. We don’t change the size of the transfer, which is still 7.6 per cent of
average labour earnings.
The P.E. result in terms of aggregate crime rate reduction is smaller than for the case of the subsidy
across the board: the aggregate crime rate goes down to 5.43%. This follows from the smaller number
of agents switching from the HS dropouts pool to the high school ﬁnishers group. Table (21) reports
the changes (with respect to the benchmark) in education shares by ability.
40Share of eligible population taking-up the subsidy, by ability bin
Bin 1 Bin 2 Bin 3 Bin 4 Aggregate
0 0.44 0.58 0.75 0.63
Table 23: Share of eligible agents who take-up subsidy and complete high school. Means-tested HS
subsidy experiment in P.E.
The most noticeable diﬀerence with respect to the unrestricted subsidy case in partial equilibrium is
the drop in criminal activity for the high school dropouts within ability bin 2 (table 22). This curious fact
can be rationalised by looking at table (23), reporting the share of eligible people taking up the subsidy
by ability group. The take-up is increasing in ability (just as enrolment in HS is increasing in ability).
However, for given wealth, the number of marginal individuals who shift education group because of
the subsidy is larger in ability bin 2 than in ability 3 or 4; this is because there are many inframarginal
individuals in bins 3 and 4 who would go to high school in any case. This is conﬁrmed by comparing
the enrolment rates in this experiment with the corresponding partial equilibrium experiment with
unrestricted subsidy: among those ability groups with positive take-up shares, only people in ability
group 2 experience a signiﬁcant change in enrolment. This explains the drop in crime rate for that
group36. This means-tested policy is having a strong eﬀect on a speciﬁc group of people (in ability bin
2) whose ability (and wealth) are high enough to have positive returns from switching education, and
low enough to ﬁnd such switch unattractive without a subsidy. With respect to the non means-tested
subsidy, many people whose assets are above the means-testing threshold are likely to remain in the HS
dropout pool (just as they were in the benchark), pulling down the crime rate in that group. On the
other hand, people who were poorer and more likely to commit crime seized the opportunity to become
HS graduates thanks to the policy.
The average initial wealth and ability of eligible people who took advantage of the programme are
signiﬁcantly higher than for those who turned down the subsidy. Table (24) summarises the main
diﬀerences between those eligible agents who took advantage of the programme and those who did not,
and compares both to the group of people who did not qualify for the programme because of higher
wealth. The results conﬁrm that only people with much lower wealth and ability did not get any
advantage from the programme. Moreover, the takers experienced much lower crime involvement over
their life cycle, although this result can be misleasing insofar we are not controlling for self-selection in
the programme. Finally, the group of non eligible agents is unsurprisingly much richer on average and
36If there was a positive take-up in ability group 1 we would observe a similar phenomenon. However the results show
that in ability group 1 there are no marginal individuals whose behaviour changes because of the policy.
41Eligible takers, eligible non takers and non–eligible: a comparison. MT HS subsidy, P.E.
eligible non eligible
take-up no take-up
Average initial wealth 2.66 0.39 12.11
Ability 1.157 1.052 1.119
Crime rate over life cycle 0.09 0.21 0.01
Table 24: Some statistics comparing eligible people who took advantage of the programme to eligible
people who did not. We also report the same statistics for people who did not wualify for the programme
because of excessive wealth. We report averagel wealth endowment at time of choice (age 16), average
ability and average crime rate over the life cycle. Experiment: means-tested HS subsidy P.E.
Enrolment rates by ability bin - means-tested HS subsidy (G.E.)
Bin 1 Bin 2 Bin 3 Bin 4 Aggregate rates
Edu 1 .19 .11 0 -.03 0
Edu 2 -.19 -.10 0 .02 -.01
Edu 3 0 -.01 0 .01 .01
Table 25: Diﬀerences with respect to benchmark (absolute changes) in shares of workers in diﬀerent
education groups by ability (IQ test) bin, given a means-tested high school subsidy intervention (general
equilibrium).
its average ability lies between the ones of the other 2 categories. Not much in terms of crime reduction
is lost by reducing the scope of the intervention, since the non eligible agents have very low crime rates
over their life cycle.
This P.E. experiment produces levels of wage and income inequality which are comparable to the
levels obtained in P.E. within the unrestricted subsidy experiment. The aggregate prison expenditure
is 0.42 (1%) of total tax revenues, whereas the aggregate transfer expenditure is 0.092 (0.02%) of total
tax revenues. The labour tax rate consistent with budget balance is 26.98%, just below the benchmark
level. Per-capita output, net of jail costs, goes up by 0.27% with respect to the benchmark.
When we turn our attention to the G.E. means-tested experiment, things are diﬀerent. The aggregate
crime rate goes down much more than in P.E., to 5.2%. Strong composition eﬀects are again present
in the G.E. case. The policy is taken up by less people than in P.E. (40% vs 63%) and only the two
highest bin groups seem to have a signiﬁcantly positive take up share. Nonetheless, crime rates by
ability and education drop substantially with respect to the benchmark as well as the P.E. counterpart.
Tables (25 − 28) summarise the results. The mechanisms at work are similar to the case of the non
means-tested subsidy.
Wage and income inequality are similar to the G.E. results for the across-the-board subsidy. The
wealth diﬀerence between eligible takers and non-takers are smaller than in the P.E. case, the ability
diﬀerence is larger: price eﬀects adjust in such a way that only high ability people are marginal with
respect to the policy. This happens because marginal returns to diﬀerent education types are closer
42Crime rates by ability bin and education group - HS subsidy in G.E.
Education group
ability bin High school dropouts High school graduates College graduates
bin 1 (lowest) -.02 -.17 -.20
bin 2 -.03 0 -.01
bin 3 -.02 0 0
bin 4 (highest) 0 .01 0
aggregate -.02 0 0
Table 26: Diﬀerence in simulated crime rates (absolute changes relative to benchmark) by ability bins
and education groups in the G.E. means-tested high school tuition subsidy experiment. The aggregate
refers to the education-speciﬁc average of diﬀerent abilities weighted by the relative size of each ability
bin.
Share of eligible population taking-up the subsidy, by ability bin
Bin 1 Bin 2 Bin 3 Bin 4 Aggregate
0 0.005 0.175 0.718 0.397
Table 27: Share of eligible agents who take-up subsidy and complete high school. Means-tested HS
subsidy experiment in G.E.
than in P.E. and make a diﬀerence for high ability people only. Lower inequality reduces the incentive
to crime for low education and low ability people.
The aggregate prison costs are just below 0.41, or 1% of total tax revenues. The cost of the transfer
programme is 0.06 which is 0.14% of total tax revenues, and the labour tax rate consistent with balanced
budget is 26.99%. Per-capita output, net of jail costs, is 0.1% higher than in the benchmark. The G.E.
eﬀects of this means-tested intervention are more cost eﬀective than an unrestricted transfer policy,
although not as eﬀective in terms of aggregate crime reduction because the unrestricted transfer policy
generated an aggregate crime rate of 5.1%. This result is due to the fact that in the means-tested case
those relatively wealthy individuals in ability bin 1 and 2 who would have gone to high school in case of
subsidy are not receiving any and the price diﬀerential is not large enough to make them switch. This
fact more than compensate an even larger decrease in crime disaggregated crime rates.
Eligible takers, eligible non takers and non–eligible: a comparison. MT HS subsidy, G.E.
eligible non eligible
take-up no take-up
Average initial wealth 2.88 1.20 12.08
Ability 1.24 1.04 1.12
Crime rate over life cycle 0.06 0.17 0.02
Table 28: Some statistics comparing eligible people who took advantage of the programme to eligible
people who did not. We also report the same statistics for people who did not wualify for the programme
because of excessive wealth. We report averagel wealth endowment at time of choice (age 16), average
ability and average crime rate over the life cycle. Experiment: means-tested HS subsidy G.E.
43Treatment and control group: a comparison. Means-Tested HS subsidy
General equilibrium case
Randomised in Randomised out
take-up no take-up
Crime rate over life cycle 0.07 0.19 0.14
Partial equilibrium case
Randomised in Randomised out
take-up no take-up
Crime rate over life cycle 0.09 0.21 0.15
Table 29: Eﬀectiveness of means-tested tuition subsidy in reducing life cycle crime. We compare people
randomised in and out of the experiment. Results are provided for both G.E. and P.E. experiments.
5.5 Introducing a Control Group: A 50/50 randomisation of the HS Subsidy
The most interesting piece of information regarding a subsidy experiment is how eﬀective it is in reducing
crime among those who receive it. In order to make a statement regarding such change, one should be
able to compare the crime rates of two groups completely identical in every respect but the subsidy.
In order to obtain such information we have repeated the means-tested HS subsidy experiment
described above with the simple variant that, among the eligible individuals, only a randomly chosen
50% would receive the subsidy (with the remaining 50% not getting anything).
For these experiments we present only result comparing the average crime rates (over their life cycle)
for eligible people randomised in or out. Here we don’t report information on the eﬀects of the policies
because they have been documented in previous sections. What matters in these experiments is the
diﬀerence in crime rates between treatment and control group. We have run these experiment both in
G.E. and P.E. and report the results for both in table (29).
The subsidy reduces life cycle crime rates by roughly half when we compare people who are ran-
domised in and take up the subsidy with people who are randomised out. These numbers are very much
in line with crime rates for the treatment and control group one year after the end of the Quantum
Opportunities Programme experiment that we have reported at the beginning of Section 5.3. Though
care must be taken due to the diﬀerent time horizon over which they are calculated, their similarity is
remarkable. It is worth noting that the average crime rate for people who are randomised out includes
observations relative to people who would not take up the programme if it was oﬀered to them. These
results suggest that a targeted subsidy policy can reduce crime rates in the target population by more
than half, with the beneﬁt being spread over a long time horizon corresponding to the life cycle of the
treated.
446 Conclusions
In this paper we have asked if a policy aﬀecting the education decisions of relatively poorer and less
able people can be more eﬀective, in terms of costs and results, in reducing (property) crime rates than
policies based on harsher punishment alone. We have developed and estimated a structural overlapping
generations, life cycle model with optimal consumption, education and crime decisions. Given the
complexity of the model, we have solved it numerically and have simulated the outcome of two alternative
sets of policies - increases in prison sentences and subsidies for high school completion. Our ﬁndings
suggest that subsidizing high school graduation is cost eﬀective and preferable to policies based on
harsher punishment. We have found that the eﬀect of a subsidy depend on the size of the intervention, i.e.
whether the programme is large enough to generate changes in prices, at least locally. Our results indicate
that, relative to partial equilibrium, price changes induce an improvement in the ability composition
of the high school dropout pool and lower income inequality across education groups. The two eﬀects
reinforce each other in reducing the crime rate. We have shown that subsidies targeted at poorer
students can be nearly as eﬀective in terms of crime reduction as unconditional subsidies, at signiﬁcantly
lower cost. Finally, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity through a randomisation of the policy
intervention, we have found that means-tested subsidies towards high school completion reduce the
average crime rate over the life cycle of a target individual by almost one half. The framework can be
easily extended to allow for diﬀerential employment risk by education and to study the eﬀect of other
interventions such as wage subsidies, unemployment beneﬁts, income tax credits and other redistributive
policies. This is ongoing research.
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A PSID Data
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics provides information on a variety of dimensions. Since the
beginning it was decided that those eligible for the 1969 and following waves of interviewing would
include only persons present in the prior year, including those who moved out of the original family
and set up their own households37. Until recently, there used to be two diﬀerent releases of PSID data,
Release I (also known as Early Release) and Release II (also known as Final Release). Early release data
were available for all years; ﬁnal release data are available (at time of writing) only between 1968 and
1993. The variables needed for our study are available in both releases. The diﬀerence is that Release
II data tend to be more polished and contain additional constructed variables. We use Release II data
for the period 1968-1993 and Release I data for the period 1994-200138.
Because of successive improvements in Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) software,
37A distinction between original sample individuals, including their oﬀspring if born into a responding panel family
during the course of the study (i.e., both those born to or adopted by a sample individual), and nonsample individuals
must be made. Details about the observations on non-sample persons and their associated weights and relevance are
included in the appendix.
38We also have results obtained from a reduced sample using only Release I data for 1968-1993: estimates of the
parameters of interest don’t substantially diﬀer from the full sample estimates.
48the quality of the Public Release I ﬁles improved dramatically in recent waves, allowing the use of these
data with conﬁdence. The diﬀerentiation between Public Release I and Public Release II has recently
been dropped altogether.
A.1 Sample selection
Unequal probabilities of selection were introduced at the beginning of the PSID (1968) when the original
Oﬃce of Economic Opportunity (OEO) sample of poor families was combined with a new equal prob-
ability national sample of households selected from the Survey Research Center 1960 National Sample.
Compensatory weights were developed in 1968 to account for the diﬀerent sampling rates used to select
the OEO and SRC components of the PSID.
The probability sample of individuals deﬁned by the original 1968 sample of PSID families was
then followed in subsequent years. A distinction between original sample individuals, including their
oﬀspring if born into a responding panel family during the course of the study (i.e., both those born to
or adopted by a sample individual), and nonsample individuals was also made. Only original sample
persons and their oﬀspring have been followed. These individuals are referred to as sample persons and
assigned person numbers in a unique range. If other individuals resided with the sample individuals,
either in original family units or in newly created family units, data were collected about them as heads,
spouses/long term cohabitors or other family unit members, in order to obtain a complete picture of
the economic unit represented by the family. However, these nonsample individuals were not followed
if they left a PSID family.
Step-by-step Sample Selection (data from 1967 to 2000). After dropping 10,607 individuals
belonging to the Latino sample and 2263 individuals belonging to the new immigrant families added
in 1997 and 1999, the joint 1967-2001 sample contains 50,625 individuals. After selecting only the ob-
servations on household heads we are left with 19,583 individuals.Dropping people younger than 25 or
older than 65 leaves us with 18,186 people. Dropping the self employment observations leaves 14,866
persons in the sample. We then select only the individuals with at least 8 (possibly non continuous)
observations, which further reduces the people in the sample to 6228. Dropping individuals with incon-
sistent education records leaves 6213 people in sample. Dropping individuals with missing, top-coded
or zero earnings reduces the sample to 5671 individuals and dropping those with zero, missing or more
than 5840 annual work hours brings the sample size to 5,660 individuals. We eliminate individuals with
49year Number of Observations year Number of Observations
1967 933 1983 1,775
1968 1,015 1984 1,802
1969 1,109 1985 1,808
1970 1,181 1986 1,829
1971 1,294 1987 1,837
1972 1,395 1988 1,840
1973 1,508 1989 1,838
1974 1,543 1990 1,809
1975 1,601 1991 1,780
1976 1,635 1992 1,697
1977 1,685 1993 1,698
1978 1,705 1994 1,638
1979 1,737 1995 1,588
1980 1,755 1996 1,510
1981 1,734 1998 1,425
1982 1,718 2000 1,298
Table 30: Number of individual observations, by year
Years of Education Number of Individuals Number of Observations
Sample from 1967 to 2000
less than 12 430 6,546
12 to 15 1,792 29,229
16 or more 863 14,945
Sample from 1967 to 1996
less than 12 430 6,380
12 to 15 1792 27,583
16 or more 863 14,034
Table 31: Distribution of individuals and total observations by years of education.
outlying earning records, deﬁned as changes in log-earnings larger than 4 or less than -2, which leaves
5,477 individuals in the sample. Finally, dropping people connected with the SEO sample reduces the
number of individuals to 3,085, with a total number of observations of 50,720.
The composition of the sample by year and by education group is reported in the following tables.
B CPS Data
the Current Population Survey (CPS) is a monthly survey of about 50,000 households conducted by
the Bureau of the Census for the Bureau of Labor Statistics.39 This monthly survey of households is
conducted for BLS by the Bureau of the Census through a scientiﬁcally selected sample designed to
represent the civilian noninstitutional population. Respondents are interviewed to obtain information
about the employment status of each member of the household 15 years of age and older. Each month
about 50,000 occupied units are eligible for interview. Some 3,200 of these households are contacted
39The survey has been conducted for more than 50 years. Statistics on the employment status of the population and
related data are compiled by the Bureau Labor Statistics (BLS) using data from the Current Population Survey (CPS).
50Descriptive Statistics: Demographic Characteristics
1967 1980 1993
age 38.04 38.93 44.29
average hourly wage-LTHS 11.82 12.69 11.02
average hourly wage-HSG 14.53 15.33 15.63
average hourly wage-CG 20.54 19.34 25.02
average ln(hourly wage)-LTHS 2.36 2.42 2.24
average ln(hourly wage)-HSG 2.59 2.59 2.60
average ln(hourly wage)-CG 2.90 2.84 3.04
median hourly wage-LTHS 10.59 11.61 10.31
median hourly wage-HSG 14.09 13.96 13.61
median hourly wage-CG 19.24 17.45 21.46
average hours worked-LTHS 2246 2093 2121
average hours worked-HSG 2268 2125 2155
average hours worked-CG 2234 2158 2196
Table 32: PSID Sample Descriptive Statistics: Earnings are annual earnings and hours are annual hours
worked. Wages are hourly wages computed as annual earnings divided by annual hours worked. Both
wages and earnings are expressed in 1992 dollars.
but interviews are not obtained because the occupants are not at home after repeated calls or are
unavailable for other reasons. This represents a non-interview rate for the survey that ranges between 6
and 7 percent. In addition to the 50,000 occupied units, there are 9,000 sample units in an average month
which are visited but found to be vacant or otherwise not eligible for enumeration. Part of the sample
is changed each month. The rotation plan, as explained later, provides for three-fourths of the sample
to be common from one month to the next, and one-half to be common with the same month a year
earlier. The CPS has been used to collect annual income data since 1948, when only two supplementary
questions were asked in April: ”How much did ... earn in wages and salaries in 1947 ...” and ”how much
income from all sources did ... receive in 1947”. Over the years, the number of income questions has
expanded, questions on work experience and other characteristics have been added, and the month of
interview relating to previous year income and earnings has moved to March. This yearly survey goes
under the name of March CPS Supplement.40 Age classiﬁcation is based on the age of the person at
his/her last birthday. The adult universe (i.e., population of marriageable age) is comprised of persons
15 years old and over for March supplement data and for CPS labor force data. Each household and
person has a weight that should be used in producing population-level statistics. The weight reﬂects
the probability sampling process and estimation procedures designed to account for nonresponse and
undercoverage. Unweighted counts can be very misleading and should not be used in demographic or
labor force analysis.
40Today, information is gathered on more than 50 diﬀerent sources of income, including noncash income sources such as
food stamps, school lunch program, employer-provided pension plan and personal health insurance. Comprehensive work
experience information is given on the employment status, occupation, and industry of persons 15 years old and over.
51Shares (%) of workers by years of schooling in each sample year
Years of schooling Years of schooling
year <12 12-15 >15 year <12 12-15 >15
1968 41.4 47.5 11.1 1985 20.0 60.0 20.0
1969 40.0 48.7 11.3 1986 19.0 60.0 21.0
1970 38.4 50.1 11.5 1987 19.0 60.0 21.0
1971 36.7 51.1 12.2 1988 18.7 60.0 21.4
1972 35.3 51.9 12.8 1989 18.2 59.8 22.0
1973 33.6 53.1 13.3 1990 17.5 60.1 22.4
1974 32.8 53.4 13.8 1991 16.8 60.6 22.6
1975 31.3 54.1 14.6 1992 15.7 61.7 22.6
1976 29.2 55.2 15.6 1993 14.8 61.7 23.4
1977 28.8 55.2 16.0 1994 14.7 61.8 23.5
1978 28.1 55.8 16.1 1995 14.6 61.1 24.3
1979 26.3 57.0 16.7 1996 14.8 60.5 24.7
1980 25.1 57.6 17.3 1997 14.7 60.7 24.6
1981 23.8 58.6 17.6 1998 14.6 60.2 25.2
1982 22.8 58.8 18.4 1999 14.4 59.8 25.8
1983 21.0 59.3 19.7 2000 14.1 59.8 26.1
1984 20.3 59.6 20.1 2001 13.8 59.6 26.6
Table 33: Percentage of people without High School degree (less than 12 years of schooling), with
High School degree (12-15 years of schooling) and with College degree (at least 16 years of completed
schooling), for the years 1968-2001. Based on CPS March Supplement data. The sample consists of
workers only.
Sample selection. We use the March CPS yearly ﬁles and additional ﬁles from 1968 to 2001. We
use the CPI for all urban consumer (with base year 1992) to deﬂate the CPS earning data and drop all
observations that have missing or zero earnings. Since the earning data are top-coded for conﬁdentiality
issues until 1995, we have extrapolated the average of the top-coded values by using a tail approximations
based on a Pareto distribution.41 For the period 1996-2000 BLS provides the averages of unreported
values for diﬀerent age/sex/empl. groups. Therefore the overall mean of the distribution is easy to
recover and we do not use any tail adjustment.
The averages of earnings, both censored and tail-adjusted, are reported in table (B), categorized by
education group and year.
41This procedure is based on a general approach to inference about the tail of a distribution originally developed by Hill
(1975). This approach has been proposed as an eﬀective way to approximate the mean of top-coded CPS earning data by
West (1985); Polivka (2000) provides evidence that this method closely approximates the average of the top-coded tails
by validating the ﬁtted data through undisclosed and conﬁdential non top-coded data available only at the BLS.
52Average Earnings (yearly, in $ ) Average Earnings (yearly, in $ )
year censored data adjusted data year censored data adjusted data
<12 12-15 >15 <12 12-15 >15 <12 12-15 >15 <12 12-15 >15
1968 14336 20609 35324 14384 20688 35725 1985 11676 19319 34656 11762 19463 36276
1969 14794 21180 35432 14794 21261 35780 1986 11626 19682 35301 11779 19834 37290
1970 14903 21610 37036 14924 21702 37540 1987 11820 20139 36598 12002 20322 39057
1971 14690 21417 36364 14839 21556 36863 1988 11991 20364 36049 12229 20668 38349
1972 14841 21157 36340 14920 21242 37115 1989 11755 20288 36084 12152 20689 38472
1973 15383 22249 37538 15541 22469 38507 1990 11265 20334 36405 11369 20811 39571
1974 15020 22232 37057 15118 22435 38110 1991 11127 19733 35296 11230 20084 38467
1975 14208 21199 34357 14335 21405 35595 1992 10661 19381 35210 10777 19710 38507
1976 13333 20468 34367 13400 20689 35949 1993 10446 19422 35363 10597 19784 39089
1977 13675 20584 34544 13796 20863 36467 1994 9955 19167 35610 10117 19617 40228
1978 13396 20979 34810 13484 21272 37267 1995 10227 19439 35991 10468 19913 41664
1979 13395 21121 34499 13613 21409 37503 1996 10579 20306 39643 10579 20306 39643
1980 13513 20678 33632 13692 21040 37283 1997 10790 20586 40073 10790 20586 40073
1981 12600 19625 32169 12701 20077 36040 1998 11287 20809 41019 11287 20809 41019
1982 12213 19223 32311 12337 19410 34289 1999 10984 21406 42794 10984 21406 42794
1983 11699 18746 32621 11730 19000 35209 2000 10784 21626 42148 10784 21626 42148
1984 11796 18928 33191 11906 19178 35585 2001 11330 22346 45147 11330 22346 45147
Table 34: Average earnings by education group, all years. Earnings are in 1992 dollars. Censored
averages are based on unadjusted, top-coded data. Adjusted averages are based on data with Pareto-
tail adjustment. From 1996 onwards censored and adjusted averages correspond because of larger data
disclosure.
Calibrated Parameter Values for Benchmark
Parameter Value Moment to Match
−
j 79 Maximum lifespan after labor market entry
jr 50 Maximum years of working life
{λj} - Survival rates
β 0.967 Wealth-Income ratio excluding top 1%
l 0.74 Average duration of unemployment
q .175 Unemployment incidence
subhigh school .019 Direct tuition cost of High School
subuniversity .19 Direct tuition cost of College
a -.865 Fraction of households with net worth ≤ 0
α .35 Capital share in total output
δ .065 Depreciation rate
p .307 Pension replacement rate
tl .27 Labor income tax
tK .40 Capital income tax
χ -.32 Aggregate property crime rate
u -.80 Elasticity of crime rate w.r.t. expected prison term
Table 35: Value of Parameters Calibrated in Benchmark
Quasi-linear utility terms associated to education
Education group
Ability Bin High School College
Bin 1 0.27 -5.80
Bin 2 0.39 -4.32
Bin 3 0.49 -2.55
Bin 4 0.89 -0.64
Table 36: Quasi-linear utility terms associated to being in education for High-School and College. The
terms diﬀer by ability bin because the enrolment rates that are matched are diﬀerent in each bin.
53